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Notes
INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY OF OFFICERS AND AGENTS
ON CONTRACTS MADE FOR CORPORATIONS
Domestic Corporations
A domestic corporation is required by the act of April
29, 1874, P. L. 76 to record the certificate of incorporation
"in the office for the recording of deeds in and for the
county where the chief operations are to be carried on".
Such a requirement has been held to be a condition pre-
cedent to the recognition of its corporate existence.'
The question arises as to what the effect is of a failure
to comply with the act, insofar as the individual liability of
officers and agents of such a corporation is concerned.
It was held in Guckert v. Hacke 159 Pa. 303 (1893),
that, "as exemption from liability is one of the chief char-
acteristics distinguishing corporations from partnerships
and unincorporated associations, incorporators who trans-
act business upon the strength of an organization which is
materially defective are individually liable as partners, to
those with whom they have dealt in ignorance of incor-
poration".2 The reason for the holding is clear: although
it is true that they (incorporators) did not intend to be-
come partners, they did engage in a joint enterprise as an
associated body. As the law knows but two forms of
associations for business or trade-corporation and partner-
ship-and as they are not a corporation they must be a
partnership.'
A plaintiff, however, in dealing with defendants as a
corporation may "estop" himself from claiming against
them in any other capacity, even though they failed to
record their charter.4 As to what would be sufficient
recognition of corporate existence to raise an "estoppel"
it was held, that "he must have knowledge of the existence
of the charter or something to put him on inquiry".5
'Guckert v. Hacke, 159 Pa. 303 (1893); Braddock Boro. v. Penn.
Water Co., 189 Pa. 379 (1899).
2New York etc. Bank v. Crowell, 177 Pa. 313 (1896).
SMachen Corp. Vol. I, p. 253.
&Cochran v. Arnold, 58 Pa. 399 (1868); Spahr v. Bank, 94 Pa.
429 (1880).
OGuckert v. Hacke, 159 Pa. 303 (1893),
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
In this connection, it is necessary to distinguish be-
tween the liability of agents expressly designated as such
and of incorporators acting as agents, not because of ex-
press authority, but because of the implied authority vested
in them by reason of their position as incorporators. It is
clear from the foregoing principles that if A should deal
with B, an incorporator, for C, the contemplated corpora-
tion, "with knowledge of the charter or something to put
him on inquiry", his only recourse would be against C, the
other party to the contract. B would be exonerated en-
tirely. If, under the same facts, B should happen to be
an agent "expressly designated" as such, not an incorpora-
tor nor being otherwise connected with the proposed cor-
poration, the same result would follow, for A's knowledge
of the charter would have the effect of limiting his re-
course to one against C only. If A should deal with B,
an incorporator, for C, without knowledge of their charter
or claim to corporate existence, B will be responsible as a
partner of the other incorporators, due to the fact that he
was an incorporator. But if, under the same facts, B were
not an incorporator but merely an agent "expressly desig-
nated", A's remedy would be limited against those who
compose C, as partners. B will be exempted from liability,
since by the case of Guckert v. Hacke, supra, the liability as
partners is imposed on only those incorporators who trans-
act business upon the strength of an organization which is
materially defective.
Foreign Corporations
On April 22, 1874, P. L. 108, the Legislature of Penn-
sylvania passed an act to carry into effect Section 5, Art. 16
of the State Constitution which provides that "no foreign
corporation shall do any business in this state without hav-
ing one or more places of business, and authorized agent or
agents in the same upon whom process may be served" in
an action against such corporation. By section 2 of the
act it is provided that "it shall not be lawful for any
foreign corporation to do any business in this Common-
wealth until it shall have filed in the office of the Secretary
of State a statement showing the title and object of the
corporation, the location of its office, and the name of the
authorized agent".6
6For the constitutionality of the act, see Lafayette Ins. Co. v.
French, 18 How. 407,
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
The purpose of the Act is to bring foreign corporations
doing business in this state within the reach of legal pro-
cess, and has the effect of rendering such corporation in-
capable of bringing any action in the courts of this Com-
monwealth, which might have arisen out of any business
transacted in this state before compliance with the act.'
As far as the citizens of Pennsylvania are concerned, how-
ever, the courts have held that they may sue the corpora-
tion and that the corporation will not be allowed to set up,
as a defense, its non-compliance with the act.8
The act, furthermore, makes it a misdemeanor for
agents of a foreign unregistered corporation to transact
business in this commonwealth and prescribes a penalty for
such violation. The courts, nevertheless, have held that the
penalty imposed by the act is not exclusive but is in ad-
dition to the common law liability of agents to the person
with Whom he dealt.9 But the courts have never gone so
far as to hold that the liability of officers, although they
might at the time have been acting as agents for the cor-
poration, is that of partners.
In Stephenson v. Dodson, 36 Pa. Super. Ct. 343, (1908)
it was held, that incorporators and members of a foreign,
unregistered corporation are not liable as partners for the
debts of the corporation unless there be apt, personal, con-
tractual words of their own in the written contract.10 On
the other hand, as to the personal liability of agents, they
have said that "one who assumes to act for a foreign cor-
poration must be held chargeable with knowledge of its
failure to comply with the act and will be personally liable
on the contract which he assumes to enter into on its be-
half". This, apparently, is on the theory of breach of
implied warranty of authority as having acted for a non-
existent principal.'
The decision in the last mentioned case does not in any
manner conflict with the former exposition of the law. In
the former cases, plaintiff dealt with the agent but relied
7Swan v. Ins. Co., 96 Pa. 37 (1880); Delaware R. Q. etc, Co. v.
Pass. Ry., 204 Pa. 22-25 (1902).
BCases supra.
9Lasher v. Stimson, 145 Pa. 30 (1892); Raff v. Isman, 235 Pa. 347
(1912).
'0 Following Bond v. Stoughton, 26 Pa. Super. Ct. 486 (1904).
"Lasher v. Stimson supra; and it makes no difference that he
acted honestly, Eichbaum v. Irons, 6 W. & S. (Pa.) 67 (1843); Kroeger
v. Pitcairn, 101 Pa. 311 (1882).
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on the liability of the corporation, the existence of which
he at the time was aware. Therefore, it was just that he
should be required to enforce that liability against the other
real party to the contract, and not against the agent. In
the last case, Lasher v. Stimson 145 Pa. 30,12 plaintiff did
not know of the existence of the corporation, he merely
knew that the agent was acting for a company, and as the
company was not in existence but a corporation, and as he
did not look forward to corporate liability, there is no
reason why he should be denied the right to hold the
agent personally liable as having assumed to act for a
principal not in existence at the time.
On June 8, 1911 P. L. 710" the Legislature passed an-
other act repealing the act of 1874, referred to. This later
act provides that "Every such corporation (meaning, for-
eign corporation) before doing any business in this Com-
monwealth, shall appoint, in writing, the Secretary of the
Commonwealth * * * to be its true and lawful agent, upon
whom all lawful process in any action or proceeding
against it, may be served". Section 4 provides: "that the
failure of any such corporation to file the power of at-
torney and statement aforesaid, with the Secretary of the
Commonwealth, shall not impair or affect the validity of
any contract with such corporation, and actions or pro-
ceedings at Law or in Equity may be instituted and main-
tained on any such contract; but no such action shall be
instituted or recovery had by any such corporation, on any
such contract, * * *, in any of the courts of this Common-
wealth etc., until such corporation complies with the pro-
visions of this act". The act further provides that a pay-
ment of $250.00 before institution of an action, shall give
the corporation the right to institute such an action, al-
though the contract was entered into without compliance
with the act.
1 2Notice that the courts make a distinction between the generic
term "company" and the specific term "corporation".
"sAmended by the act of April 22, 1915, P. L. 170. Amendment
not material to the discussion. As to the unconstitutionality of the
act of 1874 as applied to interstate commerce: see Mearchon & Co.
v. Lumber Co., 187 Pa. 12 (1898), quoted with approval in M. Gal-
vanizing Co. v. Mclnnes Co., 272 Pa. 561 (1922). In Sioux Remedy
Co. v. Cope, 235 U. S. 197 (1914) it was held that the conditions
imposed by a similar act of S. Dakota operated as an unreasonable
restraint of interstate commerce, and as such were unconstitutional
as far as applicable to it.
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This act somewhat modifies the status of an unreg-
istered foreign corporation, validating its contracts, sub-
jecting it to suits in this state and also enabling it to sue
here upon the payment of the prescribed penalty of
$250.00.14
In the latest case of Bala Corporation v. McGlinn, 295
Pa. 74, (1929), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held,
that "one who deals with a foreign corporation, knowing it
to be a corporation, can not enforce an individual liability
against the officers and agents who act for the corpora-
tion", although it has failed to register as required by the
act of 1911. Whenever it makes a contract it is the con-
tract of the legal entity and not of the individual members.
The mere fact that agents of a foreign corporation might
be punished for neglecting to register will not render them
liable for the contracts of the corporation.
The decision is consistent with those reached under
the act of 1874 and sounds consonant with justice. But,
it is submitted, that the basis of this decision as well as
that of the others, is not correct on principle.
The courts have held that the reason the plaintiff is
not allowed to sue the agents and officers individually, is
based on the ground of "estoppel". Strict estoppel involves
an actual representation by the party to be "estopped" plus
a reliance on the representation by another to his detri-
ment. Therefore, how can it be said, that plaintiff made
any representation, when as a matter of fact his conduct
was the result of his reliance on the agent's representation?
It would seem more equitable to work the "estoppel"
against the agent or officer when sued individually rather
than against the plaintiff. Why then, should the plaintiff be
denied the right to sue the agents and officers individually?
The reason should be this: The primary ground of the
doctrine of "estoppel by matter in pais" is that it would be a
fraud-in a party to assert what his previous conduct had
denied when on the face of that denial others have acted.
It is essential to its being allowed in any case, that it would
work an injury to the other party, if the defendant should
be permitted to set up his case. 5 Now, the plaintiff on
entering into the contract, looked forward to corporate
liability, as distinguished from the individual liability of the
members and agents. Therefore, the agents and officers
14Bala Corp. v. McGlinn, 295 Pa. 74 (1929). The court in this
case did not refer to the amending act of April 22, 1915, P. L. 170.
15Hill v. Epley, 31 Pa. 331 (1858).
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should not be "estopped" from showing that fact, since one
of the essentials of the doctrine of estoppel, namely, injury
to the plaintiff, is not present, because an action against the
corporation, the very thing he looked forward to, in case
of breach, is still available to him.
The objection that in such an action there is no author-
ized agent upon whom process may be served, is not ten-
able. It has been decided, that service upon such agent, if
regularly made, is good service against the corporation,
even though it failed to appoint one in accordance with the
act of 1874, before its repeal. 16 The reason being, that it is
to be presumed that the corporation appointed such agent
as one upon whom service is authorized to be made."I There
is no substantial objection to following the same course
under the act of 1911, more properly, 1915.
In short, the theory is, that plaintiff being still in a
position to enforce his rights against the corporation, the
agents and officers should not be estopped from asserting
the fact that he intended a contract with the corporation
and not with them as individuals. The theory fits the cases
of domestic corporations as well as those of foreign cor-
porations without resort to an unwarranted over-extension
of the doctrine of "estoppel".
Jose E. Oller
ADMISSIBILITY OF RECORD OF PREVIOUS CON-
VICTIONS TO ATTACK CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS-
The case of Commonwealth v. Quaranta, 295 Pa. 264, lays
down a proposition regarding the admissibility of records
of prior convictions in order to attack a witness' character
for veracity. The rule is stated by Mr. Justice Kephart to
be, "When a party becomes a witness for himself, he stands
in no better position than any other witness not a party.1
Conduct derogatory to the witness' character for veracity
may be proved by showing that he has been convicted of an
infamous offense. No collateral issue of fact is thus raised,
as the record establishes the fact. But every offense or
16Hagerman v. Slate Co., 97 Pa. 534 (1881).
ITCase supra; Eastman, Private Corporations, Vol. 1 (2d Ed.)
p. 554. Service may be made on any agent within the state, Supra;
see 23-L. R. A. 490.
'Beck v. Hood, 185 Pa. 32 (1898); Commonwealth v. Racco, 225
Pa. 113 (1909).
